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Abstract 
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Procedural vs. Monetary Policies 
Author: Bernhard Martin Siegert 
English: 
The main objective of this paper is to understand under what circumstances a government 
should focus on procedural or monetary policies to foster entrepreneurial entry. To do this, we 
measure entrepreneurship by the entry density of new companies, which counts formally 
registered entrepreneurs only. However, we also control the effect on opportunity and 
necessity-driven entrepreneurship rates, which include entrepreneurs of all stages and sectors. 
Procedural and monetary policies are represented by time and cost to start a business 
respectively. The variety of control variables used in literature is approached by aggregating 
explanatory variables from 16 studies, resulting in 44 variables of which 8 are used in the 
regression analysis. For the empirical analysis, we use country and year fixed effects with 
country-clustered standard errors. We find a stronger positive impact for lowering cost to start 
a business, especially in countries with high rates of necessity-driven entrepreneurs or 
countries which did not belong to the lowest third in cost or time to start a business. However, 
the findings also suggest, that these policies do not incentivize non-entrepreneurs to engage in 
entrepreneurship, but rather attract informally operating entrepreneurs to register their 
business. 
 
Portuguese: 
O principal objetivo deste trabalho é compreender sob quais circunstâncias a administração 
pública deve focar em políticas procedimentais ou monetárias para fomentar novos 
empreendimentos. Para isso, medimos o empreendedorismo através da entrada de novas 
companhias no mercado, considerando apenas empreendedores formalmente registrados. 
Contudo, também verificamos o efeito da oportunidade e necessidade no índice de 
empreendedorismo, o que inclui empreendedores em todas fases e setores. Políticas 
procedimentais e monetárias são representadas pelo tempo e pelo custo para começar um 
negócio, respectivamente. A pluralidade de variáveis de controle utilizada na literatura é 
abordada pela conjugação de variáveis explicativas de 16 estudos, resultando em 44 variáveis, 
das quais 8 são utilizadas na análise de regressão. Para a análise empírica, utilizamos efeitos 
fixos por país e por ano com desvios-padrão agrupados em países. Encontramos um forte 
impacto positivo para reduzir os custos para começar um negócio, especialmente em países 
com alto índice de empreendedores impulsionados pela necessidade ou países que não 
pertenciam ao terço mais baixo de preço ou tempo para iniciar um negócio. Todavia, as 
conclusões também sugerem que essas políticas não incentivam não-empreendedores a se 
envolverem no empreendedorismo, mas sim atraem empresários que atuam informalmente no 
mercado a registrarem seus negócios. 
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1. Introduction 
Since 2006 the World Bank has recorded 2782 regulatory reforms1 in the “Doing Business” 
database, of which 283 were implemented in 2015/16 in 137 countries – an increase of 20% 
compared to the previous year. The highest amount of reforms were consistently submitted 
for the “starting a business” category (World Bank, 2017c) – which uses 11 different 
indicators to measure the ease of starting a business in a country. These reforms involve 
procedural and monetary reforms, aiming to make entrepreneurship easier and cheaper. The 
question is, which current policy has the strongest impact for promoting entrepreneurship?  
In the academic community entrepreneurship is widely accepted as a driver of job creation 
and innovation (Bruton et al., 2013), which has made it a political interest and tool to drive 
economic growth. Though the benefits of entrepreneurship are evident, researchers are still 
looking for clear instruction on how to promote it. Baumol, (1993) was one of the first to 
identify specific factors on country level which influenced entrepreneurship. Despite the 
progress made since then at outlining the impact of the different levers that promote or inhibit 
entrepreneurship, practitioners still seem to be confused about the reciprocities between 
different reforms and national idiosyncrasies, which determine the success of entrepreneurial 
policy making and reformation (Nanda, 2010). For example, a targeted entrepreneurship 
credit-subsidy policy in the U.S. achieved the expected impact in the targeted group, but had 
the opposite effect on entrepreneurs not covered by the policy, decreasing their rate of 
entrepreneurship (Li, 2002). Conversely, policies not directed at entrepreneurs might impact 
new venture creation. For example, the extension of a healthcare program to underprivileged 
families, resulted in an over 20% increase in self-employment without even targeting 
entrepreneurship (Olds, 2014). Singapore noted a 75% increase in annual business registration 
after implementing an electronic registration system (Klapper et al., 2006). These examples 
illustrate a certain arbitrariness of the effects governmental policy making can have and 
underlines the importance of further research in this area. 
Researchers acknowledge important trade-offs in policies such as between stimulating or 
regulating competition (Gilbert et al., 2008) or between protecting incumbents or new 
                                                 
1 According to the OECD “regulatory reform” is used to refer to: “changes that improve regulatory quality, that 
is, enhance the performance, cost-effectiveness, or legal quality of regulations and related government 
formalities. Reform can mean revision of a single regulation, the scrapping and rebuilding of an entire 
regulatory regime and its institutions, or improvement of processes for making regulations and managing 
reform.” (OECD, 1997, p. 11) 
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entrants. Uber and Airbnb illustrate such policy trade-offs, since their business models were 
challenged in the earliest days by regulation to protect the incumbent industry (McGinn, 
2017). Also regional idiosyncrasies (Williams and Nadin, 2012) and industrial clusters are 
crucial to consider, since they can be deciding factors for network creation, knowledge 
spillover and competition (Gilbert et al., 2008). Government policies mold the constraints, 
uncertainty and opportunities of the marketplace, that encourage (or discourage) the 
entrepreneurial activity (Minniti, 2008). Unfit policies can have costly implication for the 
economy of a country.  
The importance of the phenomena is seen in the growing number of published studies on 
governmental support on entrepreneurship. From 1997 to 2006, 474 articles were published in 
academic journals on this topic. This increased from 2007 to 2016 to 1759 articles2. During 
this period, the focus of research shifted towards research on government policies (as a 
subtopic of how governments can support entrepreneurship) with 4,5 times as many articles in 
this category compared to the previous ten years. Research on governmental entrepreneurship 
policies can be grouped in the impact of procedural (e.g. Klapper et al., 2006) and monetary 
(e.g. Li, 2002) policies on entrepreneurial development, and governmental venture capitalism 
(as a special form of providing support for both) (e.g. Colombo et al., 2016). Extant research 
has looked at the influence of the boundary conditions of countries (e.g. corruption, size of 
government etc.) (Aidis et al., 2012) and individual factors of entrepreneurs (e.g. education, 
gender etc.) (Hopp and Stephan, 2012). 
Despite the topic has been well researched (both qualitatively and quantitatively) (Audretsch 
et al., (2007) Minniti, (2008)),why is there still confusion in governmental policy making? A 
closer look at the literature provides several hints. First, academics have used very different 
variables and datasets, making their results hard to compare and to apply across economies. 
Schott and Wickstrom Jensen, (2008) showed how countries, that tried to replicate successful 
policy making failed, due to their unfit for the local, cultural, economic, or political situation. 
Second, the interdependencies (how the effect of a variable changes when varying another) 
between different policies and their relative strength are still a neglected area of research. Peru 
jumped from 2009 to 2010 51 places in the global “Starting a Business” ranking, by reducing 
the time needed to register a business by 14 days and the costs by USD 121.00 (Klapper and 
                                                 
2 As at 15.02.2017 based on searching the EBESCO Database for Peer-Reviewed, English, Journal Articles on 
the search term: “government* support entrepreneurship”. Accessed via: https://goo.gl/cRry4O 
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Love, 2012). It is unclear, however, which one of these actions triggered this performance on 
entrepreneurial entry – the time or the cost reduction? Eventually only a combination of time 
and cost is effective, but how big is the relative strength of the effects? 
The main objective of this dissertation is to understand when and under what circumstances a 
government should focus on procedural or monetary policies to foster entrepreneurial entry. 
Researching this question has important implications for governments. It sheds light to the 
question whether for promoting entrepreneurship governments must take monetary actions, 
often a more complex process in terms of budget approval rather than procedural 
improvements, which could trigger comparable, eventually better results. For the future, this 
will allow policy makers to base their decisions on research results and facts. Awareness of 
such implications are also relevant for entrepreneurs as they can better estimate the 
opportunities and risks from the regulatory environment influencing their business.  
The remaining chapters are organized as follows: In chapter two each governmental 
instrument will be reviewed and relevant key variables will be elaborated. The chapter will 
finalize with a review of the gained knowledge to develop the hypotheses. Chapter three 
provides an overview of the available data and leverages on the acquired knowledge from the 
previous chapter, to pick the right variables. Following, the empirical analyses and statistical 
methods applied will be outlined. The findings will be discussed in chapter four, while the 
chapters five to seven discuss and conclude the results with the according limitations of this 
study.  
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2. Literature Review  
This chapter reviews the state of knowledge for research on entrepreneurial policy making. 
The relevant terminology of measuring entrepreneurship from a governments’ perspective 
will be explained. Following the different governmental levers to foster entrepreneurship will 
be outlined and empirically important variables for predicting it will be identified. The results 
will be summarized and used to form the hypothesis for the empirical analysis. 
2.1. Entrepreneurship and the Government 
For a long time researchers have accepted the substantial role of entrepreneurs, taking high 
risks and uncertainty (Knight, 1921) and being drivers of innovation and competition 
(Schumpeter, 1942). Entrepreneurship is defined by the habitual creation and innovation to 
build something of recognized value around perceived opportunities (Bolton et al., 2004). 
Existing literature distinguishes between the behavioral and occupational view in 
entrepreneurship. The behavioral approach describes entrepreneurship as an outcome of 
companies or individuals from their internal and external factors like culture or personal 
background (Shaker, 1993). In the occupational view, entrepreneurship is seen as a conscious 
career choice whereas the success factors are similar to other career choices, like becoming a 
teacher or a nurse (Burton et al., 2016). Both approaches are characterized by the 
entrepreneurial opportunity: 
“Entrepreneurial opportunities are a set of environmental conditions that lead to the 
introduction of one or more new products or services in the marketplace by an entrepreneur 
or by an entrepreneurial team through either an existing venture or a newly created one” 
(Dutta and Crossan, 2005, p. 426). 
Shane and Venkataraman, (2000) propose three categories for creating entrepreneurial 
opportunity. First, entrepreneurial opportunities can arise from new knowledge or 
technologies. Second, by the compensation of market gaps and inefficiencies and finally, by 
political, demographic, or regulatory shifts that allow for a different use of existing assets. 
From a government’s perspective, the third category can be influenced. This rises the 
questions if and how a government should manipulate the “set of environmental conditions” 
to create entrepreneurial opportunity. Researchers disagree about governmental intervention 
on entrepreneurship. Minniti, (2008) argues: “the fact that entrepreneurship is positively 
linked to performance does not justify public policy intervention” (p. 787). Audretsch, (2004) 
suggests intervention only at fundamental market failures. However, van Praag and Versloot, 
(2007) explain, that entrepreneurship influences the economy of a country, particularly in the 
areas of employment creation, productivity growth and high quality innovations. Hart, (2003) 
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goes a step further, arguing that the level and quality of entrepreneurship makes a difference 
in the economic vitality of communities, regions, industries, and the nation. Even though 
there is disagreement, the side of authors in favor of actively promoting entrepreneurship via 
regulatory intervention predominates (Bruton et al., 2013). 
2.2. Entrepreneurial Motivations and Measurements 
One could conclude, since entrepreneurship promotes economic growth, that countries with 
high rates of entrepreneurship have high performing economies and thus governments should 
intervene if entrepreneurship rates are low. However, not all entrepreneurs have the same 
motivation, resulting in opposing economical outputs. Besides, in the literature the rate of 
entrepreneurship is measured in several different ways.  
The occupational approach of entrepreneurship described the phenomena of entrepreneurship 
as a conscious career choice, but careers are chosen for different motivations. Acs, (2006) 
established a motivational-based differentiation between opportunity and necessity driven 
entrepreneurs. Opportunity-driven entrepreneurs (as the name says) decide to explore 
opportunities for their conviction and literally because they see the opportunity as described 
in the definition of Shane and Venkataraman, (2000). Opportunity driven entrepreneurs are 
more likely to create the desirable effects of staying sustainably in business and employing 
people (GEM, 2017), which is why their contribution to the economy is according to the 
findings of Hart, (2003) or Bruton et al., (2013) positive. Necessity-driven entrepreneurs on 
the other side engage in entrepreneurship because they have no other choice. This results from 
different reasons such as the typically lower level of education among necessity-driven 
entrepreneurs (van Stel et al., 2007) complemented by a lower developed job market. 
Fittingly, developing countries usually have a much larger share of necessity driven 
entrepreneurship. Necessity entrepreneurs have a negative impact on the GDP (Sautet, 2013). 
This roots in the fact, that they are less likely to actually register their business and enter the 
formal economy (Acs et al., 2008). Hence, a country could have high rates of 
entrepreneurship, but not a high performing economy. 
Entry measurements of these two motivational groups of entrepreneurs result in different rates 
of entrepreneurship. However, literature uses even more diverse indicators to measure 
entrepreneurial entry in a country. A widely accepted indicator is the entry density, defined as 
newly registered LLCs measured by the World Bank per 1000 working age people (e.g. used 
by Klapper and Delgado, 2007). This indicator only measures entrepreneurs which already 
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entered the formal economy3. Quite the opposite is the indicator of the nascent 
entrepreneurship rate, also called baby entrepreneurs because they are in the earliest stage of 
entrepreneurship without having earned salaries yet (e.g. used by Koellinger and Minniti, 
(2009) or Wennekers et al., (2005)). Compared to the entry density, nascent entrepreneurs 
include especially entrepreneurs in the informal economy, who did not register their business 
officially yet. Nascent entrepreneurship is measured by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
consortium (GEM), which also provides the total early-stage entrepreneurial-activity (TEA) 
indicator. The TEA includes nascent, but also owner managers of new businesses less than 42 
month old, making it one of the most comprehensive indicators (e.g. used by Aidis et al., 
(2012)). The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor offers also the previously mentioned 
distinction between opportunity and necessity-driven entrepreneurship with the TEA as base-
indicator. Appendix 2 provides an overview of the entrepreneurial process, which also 
illustrated the scope of the different measures. 
Table 1 Commonly used indicators for measuring entrepreneurship 
There are some important caveats to consider when choosing the variable for measuring 
entrepreneurship. Many indicators that rely on data of the formal sector, like entry density, 
tend to under-estimate entrepreneurship, since self-employments and informal companies are 
left out (Desai, 2009). On the other hand, the GEM data over-estimates entrepreneurship, as it 
includes next to formally registered companies, also nascent entrepreneurs, that might never 
actually register their company. The true rate of entrepreneurship lies in between these 
                                                 
3  A LLC (limited liability company) is counted when it has start-up capital of ten times income per capita, and 
has a turnover of at least 100 times income per capita World Bank (2017c)). 
Variable Definition Source 
TEA Total Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity; percent of 18-64 age 
group who are either a nascent entrepreneur (actively involved in 
starting a new business) or owner-manager of a new business (less 
than 42 months old). 
GEM, 
(2017) 
TEA OPP Opportunity-Driven Entrepreneurial Activity; Those involved in 
TEA who claim to be driven by opportunity as opposed to finding 
no other option for work. 
GEM, 
(2017) 
TEA NEC  Necessity-Driven Entrepreneurial Activity; Those involved in TEA 
who are involved in entrepreneurship because they had no other 
option for work. 
GEM, 
(2017) 
Nascent 
Entrepreneu
rship Rate 
18-64 population who are currently a nascent entrepreneur, i.e., 
actively involved in setting up a business they will own or co-own; 
this business has not paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to 
the owners for more than three months 
GEM, 
(2017) 
Entry 
Density 
Number of newly registered limited liability companies per 1,000 
working-age people (aged 15-64) 
World Bank, 
(2017b) 
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indicators (Acs et al., 2008). This dissertation will use entry density as dependent variable, 
which will be furtherly discussed later in this dissertation. 
2.3. Modes of Governmental Support 
A starting point for understanding the role of government to support entrepreneurs was Sotos', 
(1989) seminal study on informal markets in Peru. Soto describes the rational choice 
entrepreneurs face when confronted with the costs (time and money) of formal markets as 
compared to staying informal4. He argued, that for all the costs informality poses, such as the 
loss of formal legal protection or productivity (due to resources used to remain undetected by 
authorities), a relatively innovative business, even if facing the costs of formality, will be 
larger than informality ever permits. Therefore, he was a strong advocate for reforming public 
institutions to lower the barriers of entry into the formal economy.  
Following up on Soto, Williams and Nadin, (2012) showed, that informality is neither a 
problem of the past nor only of the third world, as nearly two-thirds of the global working 
population and over half in the European Union have worked, at least temporarily, in the 
informal economy. Public intervention can be categorized into procedural and monetary 
policies, as well as public venture capitalism5. The regulatory environment plays a major role 
for successful entrepreneurship (Ribeiro and Galindo, 2012). The different mechanisms how a 
                                                 
4 Whereas informality is defined as “the collection of firms, workers, and activities that operate outside the legal 
and regulatory frameworks or outside the modern economy” Benjamin et al. (2014) 
5 Public VCs (Venture Capitals) are not part of the empirical evaluation since their punctual influence does not 
significantly influence the entry density of new companies in a country (Minniti, 2008). For completeness, this 
passage gives a summary on the state of research on public VCs: Since the economic crisis of 2009 private VCs 
prefer more risk-safe investments (Colombo et al. 2016). Public VCs are an instrument to bridge the finance gap 
between the public and the private market. Furthermore, governments can sponsor areas of their political interest 
(e.g. start-ups of a certain industry). Public venture capitalism is a form of private equity, that combines 
monetary with procedural policies, by giving selected start-ups a monetary grand (often in exchange for equity), 
but also guidance in e.g. the incorporation process to let founders focus on their business (e.g. Startup Chile) 
(Bussang, 2014).Agencies like DARPA and SBIR in the U.S., Yozma (Hebrew for "initiative") in Israel, Sitra 
and Tekes in Finland or Startup Chile have actively shaped and created markets defying the view, that policy is 
meant to simply “fix” market failures. These direct investments are more successful at generating new private 
investment than the same money spent through indirect measures like tax credits (Mazzucato 2016). 
Governments started participating in this market either by founding their own institutions (Lerner, 1996) or via 
third party investments like pension funds (Minniti, 2008). As a third option, governments also adjusted 
legislations to make the work of private VCs easier, which proved also successful to attract more private VC 
funding (Brander et al. 2015). Common measures of the VC activity by public bodies are the percentage of 
companies managing to exit the VC program (depending on the VCs individual investment and mentoring 
strategy), the amount of further investment collected or the jobs created after a certain time period Brander et al. 
(2015). Since VCs are more focused on their operations as opposed to the macro level of the country’s economy, 
they eventually are more successful than procedural or monetary policies in making new companies succeed, but 
in terms of the entry density, their presence can hardly be measured at a country level (Minniti, 2008). 
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government can alter the conditions of entrepreneurship are well studied by the academic 
community (Audretsch et al., 2007; Minniti, 2008).  
2.3.1. Procedural Policies and Regulations 
Procedures are step-by-step instructions on how to complete a task. In every country, there are 
certain procedural requirements an entrepreneur needs to fulfill to be formally registered as an 
entrepreneur. Therefore, procedural policy making or reformation describes the setup or 
alteration of such requirements (Bower and Abolafia, 1996). For a more tangible view on 
what bureaucratic requirements there are Appendix 1 shows a list of possible procedures 
necessary to register a company collected from different countries. 
Djankov et al., (2002) studied the regulation of entry in formal markets more closely. In their 
study, they pioneered the first attempt to understand and rank the effect of procedural 
regulations and entrepreneurial entry. They associated weaker entry of companies into the 
formal market with less democracy and higher corruption, concluding that regulations benefit 
only the regulators and incumbents. However, the authors did not provide a clear link between 
types of regulation and new business formation.  
Building on Djankov et al., (2002) work in the following years, further authors dedicated their 
research to the connection between procedural regulations and entrepreneurship. All of them 
confirmed the positive connection between procedural and bureaucratic deregulation and 
entry rate of entrepreneurs. Klapper et al., (2006) findings indicated a lower rate of new 
ventures in (European) countries with high procedural requirements. A similar conclusion was 
reached by Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2006), who tested at a company level and combined it with 
explanatory country level variables. As procedural significant factors, the authors identified a 
developed formal legal system to ensure contract compliance, efficient bankruptcy processes 
and an incorporation process with fewer bureaucratical steps.  
Also, the effects of procedural requirements on the different motivational groups of 
entrepreneurs were studied. McMullen et al., (2008) showed in their research, that especially 
formal property protection has a stronger positive effect for opportunity-driven, but not for 
necessity-driven entrepreneurs. This seems plausible when recalling the findings that only 
opportunity-driven entrepreneurs have a positive effect on the economy (Acs, 2006). Since 
necessity-driven entrepreneurs are less likely to formally register their business they cannot 
take as much advantage of the benefits like legal protection formality permits, just as Soto, 
(1989) predicted. 
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Authors across the field agreed on the benefits of procedural deregulation, but also a system 
which makes it easy for entrepreneurs to claim their legal rights. Necessity-driven and non-
registered entrepreneurs pose an exception. Estrin et al., (2013) summarized this effect by 
relating it more generally to the quality of a countries’ formal institutions – in other words, 
the locations where bureaucratic or legal protection is enacted. Paradoxically, Aidis et al., 
(2012) found an inverse relation between entrepreneurial entry and governments’ relative 
size, which they explained by the inability of these governments to collect and allocate 
resources properly. 
The potential of procedural reduction becomes visible when looking at the World Banks', 
(2017c) indicators of measuring bureaucracy and procedural requirements. If all 3.1 million 
new LLC companies in 2012 followed the best practices of the leading economies, they 
would have saved 45.4 million days of work spent for satisfying bureaucratic requirements. 
Overall, there is consent in the academic community about the positive impact of the 
reduction of procedural obstacles, property protection and bureaucracy on the entry of new 
companies (Ribeiro and Galindo, 2012). 
Measures 
For measuring procedural requirements different approaches have been used in the literature. 
The GEM consortium offers among others in their NES (National Expert Survey) data, an 
indicator for “Government Support and Policy” rated on a Likert scale from 1-56. Together 
with the previously mentioned TEA indicator, several studies have used the GEM database to 
study the impact of procedural measures on the entrepreneurial entry rate (Estrin et al., 2013; 
McMullen et al., 2008; Schott and Wickstrom Jensen, 2008). However, this indicator has the 
disadvantage of not being based on tangible measures but surveys, which makes it more prone 
to biased data. The World Banks’ “Doing Business” dataset uses more tangible measures, 
such as the number of steps and time necessary to register a business. Klapper and Love, 
(2012) used these measures to study the effects of procedural reforms on the entry density of 
new firms, which, like the authors before, revealed a positive relation between time reduction 
and new entry formation. This dissertation will use the World Banks’ “time to start a 
business” variable to analyze procedural policy making on entrepreneurship, since it has the 
benefit of being unbiased and based on the institutional performance of a country. The time an 
entrepreneur needs to register his business affects him at the point of business registration. 
                                                 
6 Details on the data collection process are accessible at: http://www.gemconsortium.org/about/wiki 
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This makes sense in combination with a formal measure like entry density. Nascent 
entrepreneurs in comparison are not yet affected by such institutional regulations. 
2.3.2. Monetary Policies and Regulations 
While the term “monetary policies” usually is associated with the macroeconomic influence 
central institutions take for balancing money supply to control inflation, growth or 
consumption (Friedman, 1968), this dissertation uses it to describe the influence a government 
takes on the rate of entrepreneurship e.g. via the allocation of money to entrepreneurs, either 
by reducing their costs or subsidizing them on a country-wide scale. 
In advanced economies getting access to finance is the fourth most pressing concern for 
SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises), while in developing countries it is the number 
one concern (Daniels et al., 2016). Several studies show that the exploitation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities is more likely for people with less capital constraints (e.g. Evans 
and Leighton, 1989; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). This was also shown by the study of a subsidy 
program in the U.S. where the provision of health insurances to low income families raised 
self-employment of such families by 20%-30% (Olds, 2014). Similar findings were observed 
by James (2015) when studying the expansion of a food stamp program where eligible 
families were 20% more likely to own a business after qualifying for the new program 
(James, 2015). Both authors concluded, that small improvements to financial security 
triggered an increased willingness to start a business. However, recently there has been an 
increase of new start-up financing opportunities on the private market. Besides the established 
methods of self-funding, regular loans and the notorious 3 Fs “fools, families and friends”, the 
most commonly used sources are venture capital firms, crowdfunding, angels and accelerators 
(Bussang, 2014). However, some sectors, such as cutting-edge medicine, agriculture or 
energy production, are disproportionate risky or have high start-up costs making them rather 
unattractive for the private market. Besides, there are often finance gaps for small scale 
entrepreneurs with low ROI (GEM, 2017). Here lies the reason for monetary policy making: 
bridging the gap to the private market. 
A government has three possibilities to influence entrepreneurs via monetary policy making, 
of which all have been proven to have a positive effect on entrepreneurs: (1) giving access to 
finance, (2) lowering financial burdens of running operations or (3) lowering the financial 
barriers of entry. Popular methods for the first category are microfinancing schemes, mutual 
credit guarantees or interest subsidies (Minniti, 2008; Sabin, 2015). The most common 
  Literature Review 
11   
method for the second category is taxation. Da Rin et al., (2011) observed a positive effect of 
lower corporate taxes and new venture creation. The third category describes, similar to the 
procedural obstacles to found a business, the financial capital needed to start a business. The 
World Bank, (2017c) estimates every 10% decrease on the cost to start a business leads to a 
1% increase in entry density of new companies. However, as much as a government can do 
right with monetary policies directed to entrepreneurs, it is in practice not trivial. Li, (2002) 
investigated governmental interest subsidies for entrepreneurs and SMEs. It showed a great 
increase for the targeted income group of entrepreneurs, but due to rising bank rates not-
targeted entrepreneurs were worse off, which overall resulted even in lower entrepreneurship 
rates. Li recommended the allocation of financial programs specifically to poor and capable 
entrepreneurs to have the biggest impact. 
Measures 
In the literature, different indicators have been used to study political monetary effects on 
entrepreneurs. The GEM consortium offers in the NES survey separate indicators on 
financing and taxation for entrepreneurs (Daniels et al., 2016). Djankov et al., (2002) found 
high significant effects between costs of business registration (expressed as a percentage of 
GNI) per capita and entrepreneurial entry. Klapper et al., (2006) used company and industry 
level data to measure their “reliance on supplier trade financing” while controlling “the ratio 
of domestic credit to the private sector (scaled by GDP)“ to measure the access to finance on 
the country level. As a proxy for capital market development, they used the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP. Klapper and Love, (2012) measured financial barriers to entry 
more straight forward with minimum capital needed for entry7 and the cost to start a business. 
Aidis et al., (2012) simplified this even more by reducing the financial proxy to a dummy 
distinguishing between capital funding received or not. 
Compared to procedural policy making the financial side of promoting entrepreneurship 
seems less straight forward and it is hard to define a framework for the context and 
combination of the national idiosyncrasies and policies. Research overall agrees on the 
benefits of giving entrepreneurs easier access to financial assets complemented ideally with 
lower tax burdens. Since this dissertation aims to compare procedural and monetary policies, 
                                                 
7 Daniels et al. (2016) note on this: “Low start-up costs in Africa and Latin America & Caribbean are probably a 
reflection of the type of ventures started by entrepreneurs. Many of these entrepreneurs are likely to be in the 
retail/wholesale and services sectors. Barriers to entry into these sectors, in terms of both skills and capital 
required, are low” (p.82). Therefore, there is a potential bias for the types of businesses started. 
  Literature Review 
12   
it is important to pick indicators which target the same group of entrepreneurs (formal 
entrepreneurs covered in entry density) and affect them at the same point in time. Therefore, 
this dissertation will use the World Banks’ “costs to start a business” as variable to measure 
the effect of monetary policy making on entrepreneurship, since it affects entrepreneurs 
simultaneously as “time to start a business”. Appendix 2 shows the entrepreneurial process in 
connection with the different entrepreneurial measures and the effect of time and cost within 
the process. 
2.4. Explanatory Factors for Entrepreneurship 
The academic community has dedicated numerous studies to explain the entrepreneurship rate 
on a country level. While this dissertation focuses on investigating the effect of the amount of 
time and cost to start a business on entrepreneurship, there are obviously a variety of other 
important factors influencing entrepreneurship. Researchers acknowledged this and included 
diverse explanatory variables to reach robust results. However, results are hard to compare 
not only because of the different dependent variables (described in table 1), but also because 
of the disunity about which explanatory variables to include. This chapter intents to shed light 
on the variety of variables used to explain entrepreneurial entry. 
Table 2 Aggregated common independent variables to explain entrepreneurial entry 
Category Variable Category Variable 
Government 
Bureaucracy 
Finance 
Tax 
Corruption Minimum Capital for Entry 
Regulation Credits 
Size of State Development of System 
Election Year Unemployment Support 
Fragmentation Funding achieved 
Governance Social Security 
Location of Power 
Legal System 
Insolvency 
Stability Employment 
Country 
Industries Property Rights 
Informality Protection Index 
Internet Spread Contract Enforcement 
Population Development Level 
Economy 
GDP Effectiveness 
VC-Investments 
Individual Data 
Education 
Income Gender 
R&D-Transfer Age 
Economic Freedom Experience 
FDI Network 
Unemployment Rate Previous Business Ownership 
Innovation Marital Status 
Investment Horizon Minority Group 
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After reviewing the main studies of entrepreneurial entry, (see Appendix 3 for the complete 
table) distinct categories and variables related to new venture creation were identified. For 
this, all explanatory variables of the studies were listed and categorized. Since in many cases, 
researchers used the same variables, but assigned different names (e.g. contract enforcement 
and legal protection effectiveness), these variables were aggregated to a common name. Table 
2 shows the results of this aggregation process. Overall the variables could be grouped into 
six categories. The variables per category are ranked from the most (top) to the least often 
(bottom) used per category.  
In the “government” category corruption is seen as an important factor that explains the level 
of new businesses, with studies clearly indicating a negative influence for development of 
entrepreneurial activities at a procedural (Klapper et al., 2006) as well as monetary level (Da 
Rin et al., 2011). Djankov et al., (2002) related corruption to higher regulation, which favors 
the incumbents and regulators. Aidis et al., (2012) show a relationship between the size of the 
state, corruption and (lower) quality of institutions. 
Variables in the “finance” category are often expressed in development indicators (e.g. 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006; Lerner and Schoar, 2010). In the “Legal System” category, 
insolvency and employment rights are considered the most important. The more liberal the 
higher the benefits for entrepreneurial entry (van Stel et al., 2007). Property protection rights 
have a positive effect on an entrepreneurial community and should be strict and effectively 
enforced (Estrin et al., 2013). 
Variables from the “country” category often serve as control variables, e.g. when statements 
are tested across industries (Cumming, 2007) or formality (Williams and Nadin, 2012). 
However, economic indicators are among the most important categories of influencing 
variables. Almost every study performed on a cross country level controlled for the GDP. 
Actually, the majority settled on the conclusion, that GDP and entrepreneurial entry is best 
described by a logarithmic relationship (Aidis et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 2013; Murdock, 
2012). Researchers used further variables (like average income, unemployment rates etc.), to 
measure the level of prosperity in a country. The distinction of developed and developing 
countries is especially important when measuring opportunity and necessity-driven 
entrepreneurship, since it shows a strong correlation (Acs, 2006) between higher rates of 
necessity-driven entrepreneurship in developing countries. It is noteworthy that developing 
countries must be particularly careful when trying to replicate the success of developed 
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countries. As Schott and Wickstrom Jensen, (2008) showed, many developing countries that 
replicated policy making, failed in their purpose due to their unfit for the local cultural and 
economic situation and the enforcement used to promote entrepreneurship.  
Last but not least, individual factors matter. Research at the company or individual level 
considers the idiosyncrasies of the entrepreneur as a person. Gender, age, network capabilities 
of the founders, previous business ownership, and cultural factors have been shown to matter 
significantly to starting a new business (Cancino et al., 2015; Hopp and Stephan, 2012). 
Education is one of the most impactful individual measures, but often also used at a country 
level. In most studies, only higher education plays a role as indicator (Aidis et al., 2012; 
Cancino et al., 2015). This is consistent with the findings of Acs, (2006) and van Stel et al., 
(2007), that show that mostly entrepreneurs with higher education are opportunity-driven, 
while for necessity-driven entrepreneurs education is not a significant factor.  
2.5. Hypotheses Development 
The literature review reflects the essence of the current state of research for governmental 
levers to promote entrepreneurship. Having established a clear overview of the most 
important indicators and influencers, in the next section the main research question of this 
dissertation will be explored: “Should a government focus on procedural or monetary policy 
making and regulation to promote entrepreneurial entry” or more practically – will 
entrepreneurship in a country grow more by making it easier or less costly to pursue?” The 
literature review has shown how the answer to this may vary drastically depending on the 
circumstances. This means the research question should be broken down into more 
hypotheses, which together can answer the main question of this research. The hypotheses are 
framed to be mutually exclusive, but completely exhaust the main research questions. They 
outline the different contexts the entrepreneurial entry should be tested on, to conclude in the 
most robust way possible. 
The literature review has shown conflicting views between procedural and monetary policies, 
regarding the magnitude of benefits to increase new venture creating. However, authors like 
Djankov et al., (2002) or Da Rin et al., (2011) argue for implementations of monetary 
reforms. Thus: 
H1a:  Monetary policymaking, measured by “cost to start a business”, has a stronger 
impact for incentivizing entrepreneurship, than procedural policy making (ceteris 
paribus). 
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Others like Lerner and Schoar, (2010) or Klapper and Love, (2012) recommend to primarily 
streamline bureaucratic procedures. As Lerner and Schoar conclude quite plausibly in their 
study, a reduction of procedural burdens can have an automatic impact on costs as well. Thus: 
H1b:  Procedural policymaking, measured by “time to start a business”, has a stronger 
impact for incentivizing entrepreneurship than monetary policy making (ceteris 
paribus). 
Daniels et al., (2016) states, that in developing countries access to finance is a far more 
pressing concern compared to developed countries. We also know that developing countries 
have a higher share of necessity driven entrepreneurs (GEM, 2017). Since the differentiation 
of entrepreneurial motivations and their effect on the economy is an impactful concern (Acs, 
2006), the second hypothesis will further explore this context. Thus: 
H2:  Monetary policies have a stronger effect for incentivizing entrepreneurship than 
procedural policies, in countries with high necessity driven entrepreneurship rates 
(ceteris paribus). 
While researchers used all kinds of controls for entrepreneurship, none so far tested on the 
effects of policies for countries, which already substantially lowered cost and time. Can these 
countries still affect entrepreneurship rates by lowering cost and time to start a business even 
more? It is intuitive to say that lowering a condition which already is low, cannot create as 
much of an impact. On the other hand, eventually in countries with a well-developed business 
environment, the population reacts even stronger to small changes in the regulatory 
environment. The hypothesis on this topic is according to the intuitive path: 
H3:  Countries with beneficial pre-conditions in cost to start a business or time to start a 
business cannot affect entrepreneurship with new policies as strong as countries with 
no pre-condition (ceteris paribus). 
Acs, (2006) and Sautet, (2013) have shown the different motives and impacts of opportunity 
as opposed to necessity driven entrepreneurs. Opportunity driven entrepreneurs are said to be 
more likely to create the desirable effects of staying sustainably in business and employing 
people, while necessity driven entrepreneurs even have a negative impact on GDP (GEM, 
2017). Policies are naturally directed to support only the positive impacts. H4 will help to 
control whether policies impact the “desired” opportunity entrepreneurs. Thus: 
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H4:  Governmental policies (monetary and procedural) have a positive impact on 
opportunity driven entrepreneurship, but not necessity driven entrepreneurship 
(ceteris paribus). 
 
 
  
Graph 1 Hypothesis framework 
  Methodology 
17   
3. Methodology 
Following, the sources and structures of available datasets will be explored. The process of 
data consolidation and variable selection will be outlined. With this information, the models 
used for answering the hypotheses and their findings can be explained. 
There are a few organizations that are making relevant data on entrepreneurial research 
publicly available today. The most embracing dataset is offered by the World Bank and the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, but also organizations like the Heritage Foundation, the 
OECD or the World Economic Forum offer valuable data. Appendix 4 illustrates the variables 
used and the corresponding sources and definitions. 
3.1. Data Sourcing and Consolidation 
Established in 2003, the World Bank “Doing Business” (DB) dataset, one of the largest 
dataset with entrepreneurial relevant data, measures the ease of starting and operating a 
business in a country over a time span of 13 years. Since the WB continuously seeks to get a 
better view of the world economy, its initial 133 economies and 5 indicators were 
progressively expanded and cover now 190 countries and 11 indicators. Obviously, this 
means in terms of longitudinal data from each country, that the dataset is unbalanced. The 
indicators measured include: “starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting 
electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, 
trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency” (World Bank, 2017a). 
Doing Business is a dependable source to measure the effect of policy changes on 
entrepreneurial development, since it measures the regulatory environments faced by SMEs in 
the formal sector. These SMEs make up the majority of every entrepreneurship indicator (as 
opposed to e.g. start-ups issued or bought by multinational companies) and they are the most 
likely to benefit from regulatory reforms that improve the business environment (Acs et al., 
2008). Next to the Doing Business dataset, the World Bank also provides a list of economic 
indicators such as GDP, income per capita, GNI, unemployment rates or internet penetration. 
The GEM research was set up in 1997 to investigate different entrepreneurial activities in 
association with economic growth. By now it embraces individual level ambitions and 
attitudes towards entrepreneurship (GEM, 2017). Most importantly for research on policy 
making, it distinguishes between opportunity-driven and necessity-driven entrepreneurship, 
which is particularly useful for understanding why certain policies might stimulate 
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entrepreneurship, but cannot contribute to a better economic outcome. Country level data of 
the GEM surveys is currently only available up to 2013. 
Both sources embrace the economic situation, entrepreneurial activities and individual data on 
the entrepreneur as a person, but miss important information on judicial effectiveness, 
property rights or corruption. The Heritage Foundations’ index of economic freedom 
measures these factors, whereas each indicator is put together via a unique formula of 
different factors. The Index includes 12 variables – from property rights to financial freedom 
– in 186 countries over the past 20 years. Countries are ranked on a 0-100 scale on each of the 
12 indicators, resulting in an overall score of economic freedom (Miller, 2016). 
To create a comprehensive dataset, a unique ID for each country and year was created by 
connecting the name and year and eliminating all spaces or dashes to prevent ambiguous 
spellings. Following the datasets were merged according to this ID. The consolidation process 
was more complicated. Each dataset covers a different set of countries and time spans, 
including variables that were added over time. The GEM dataset covers only between 28 and 
40 countries and was left out from analysis for the first iterations. To create the critical 
amount of data needed for testing the hypotheses significantly, the goal was to remain with a 
balanced panel of as many countries over the longest consecutive time period with as many 
variables as possible. To achieve this, the data was trimmed in several iterations to eliminate 
variables and years with the least amount of observations. This yielded 31 variables from the 
World Bank, Heritage Foundation and World Economic Forum with complete observations 
for 75 countries from 2006 to 2013, leaving 600 rows (country year combinations) and 18600 
observations overall. The GEM data, however, was more limited. Reducing the data to an 
unbalanced panel regarding the availability of observations on TEA-OPP and TEA-NEC, the 
data reduced to 64 countries and 335 data rows. Balancing this panel left only 31 countries 
from 2006 to 2013 equaling to 248 data rows. 
3.2. Measures and Data Structure 
Table 1 showed common variables to measure entrepreneurship. The choice of the 
measurement is likely to affect the significance of the regression analysis. Entry density 
measures the number of new registered companies in relative terms, which is a lot more 
objective when comparing countries of different sizes. Surprisingly, entry density and TEA 
(total early-stage entrepreneurship) are slightly negatively correlated, which was observed by 
other authors before as well (Acs et al., 2008). They explained this phenomena by 
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entrepreneurs that never actually register their company, but are included in the GEM survey 
Controlling correlations for a time lag, TEA-OPP becomes slightly positive correlated, while 
TEA-NEC is consistently negatively correlated. This indicates a tendency of opportunity 
driven entrepreneurs to actually register their companies at a later point of time compared to 
necessity driven entrepreneurs. Therefore, entry density captures entrepreneurs that are more 
likely to stay in business. There are over twice as many observations on entry density, which 
increases the accuracy of regression analyses. Therefore, entry density will be used as 
dependent variable. 
The compiled dataset holds one or more variables for each category described in table 2. The 
table showed a summary of all possible variables, but authors used them in different 
combinations and with different outcome variables. All together, these variables show 
multicollinearity. In the first pre-selection, a correlation table was created to identify the most 
significant variables related to entry density and the strongest “competing” variables among 
them. Following the common econometric approach (Lu et al., 2017), the variables were 
tested in a progression of regression models (with entry density as outcome variable) with 
additional control variables added at each step and by themselves to control for their 
significance and the effect on R2. To adjust non-linear relation the variables were also tested 
in different modes (normal, log-normal, normal – log, log-log) (Wooldridge, 2011). It turned 
out, almost all variables showed a log-log relationship to entry density, which sorted out 
eventual normal-distribution issues and heteroscedasticity (Aidis et al., 2012; McMullen et 
al., 2008). Table 3 gives an overview of correlations between all selected variables. 
Table 3 Correlation table 
 
Entry 
Density 
Time Cost Registering 
Property 
Getting 
Credit 
Profit 
Tax- 
Enforcing 
Contracts- 
Resolving 
Insolvency 
GDP GNI(pc) 
Entry Density           
Time -0.35***         
Cost -0.58*** 0.55***         
Registering Property 0.29*** -0.37*** -0.46***        
Getting Credit 0.28*** -0.27*** -0.36*** 0.29***       
Profit Tax -0.22*** 0.05 0.10* -0.05 -0.01      
Enforcing Contracts 0.47*** -0.50*** -0.63*** 0.43*** 0.27*** -0.04     
Resolving Insolvency 0.29*** -0.49*** -0.51*** 0.22*** 0.38*** 0.02 0.39***    
GDP -0.14*** -0.21*** -0.29*** 0.09* 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.14*** 0.31***   
GNI(pc) 0.49*** -0.41*** -0.65*** 0.30*** 0.27*** -0.06 0.52*** 0.57*** 0.50***  
Government Integrity 0.50*** -0.41*** -0.64*** 0.33*** 0.31*** -0.17*** 0.53*** 0.61*** 0.37*** 0.85*** 
All variables are significantly correlated to the dependent variables entry density. The 
variables of interest, cost of starting a business (measured in % of income per capita) and time 
to start a business (measured in days), are negatively correlated, indicating the expected 
relationship – the higher the cost and time, the lower the entry density. This intuitive finding 
also applies to profit tax. The negative relation of GDP is not as intuitive, but follows 
previous findings (McMullen et al., 2008). An explanation is, that the higher level of 
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development, the less people need to rely on entrepreneurship as a source of income, but 
rather can enter a well-developed job market. GNI and government integrity still have the 
biggest issue of multicollinearity, however, all models were tested with and without either one 
and the results showed that no harm of the predictive quality was caused by keeping both in 
the model. Previous literature also suggested the importance of both variables (Djankov et al., 
2002; Wennekers et al., 2005). Both are positively correlated with entry density (whereas GNI 
surprisingly opposes GDP).  
The influence of GDP shows the different realities of policy making on entrepreneurship 
according to the development of a country (Acs, 2006). The World Economic Forum provides 
a “Global Competitiveness Index” of countries, which sorts them into three categories 
depending on the fulfillment of development criteria. 37,3% of the countries in the sample are 
innovation-driven, 41,3% efficiency-driven and 21,3% factor-driven. Innovation-driven 
countries, the highest development category, had the strongest entry density but were the most 
affected by the 2009 financial crisis. The crisis increased risk averseness of many financial 
institutions and therefore the access to investments for entrepreneurs. Factor-driven 
economies, which are the least developed economies showed almost no impact from the 
recession in comparison. However, innovation driven countries also recovered quickly due to 
the higher developed financial systems (World Bank, 2010). 
As previously mentioned, data with the distinction of opportunity and necessity driven 
entrepreneurship is limited. H2 (monetary policies have a stronger influence than procedural 
policies in countries with high rates of necessity-driven entrepreneurship), would be 
challenging to test with the current data, since the GEM only measures the actual rates of this 
Graph 2 Entry density development per country status 
Note: Graph 2 shows the evolution of entry density according to the global competitiveness assigned by 
the WEF (see Appendix 4 for definition). 
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motivational distinction for between 28 
to 40 countries in the time frame. In the 
sample 90% of the above-average 
necessity-driven countries are factor and 
efficiency driven economies. Therefore, 
efficiency and factor driven economies 
are a good proxy for high necessity-
driven entrepreneurship and can be used 
to leverage the full dataset and make results more robust. 
H3 looks at countries that may have already begun from a low value in time or cost to start a 
business at the beginning of the compiled dataset. These are countries with pre-conditions8 A 
country may have preconditions regarding time and cost separately or simultaneously. From 
the sample half of the countries have at least one pre-condition (and half of these have both). 
To test H3, countries with at least one pre-condition have been assigned to the pre-condition 
dummy. Graph 4 shows the average entry density for the two groups: pre-conditional 
countries and economic development. It is peculiar how factor-driven economies with pre-
conditions have a similar average entry density as innovation driven economies without (p < 
0,05 of the according t-test - see Appendix 5, test 1), since graph 2 showed the difference in 
entry density between factor and 
innovation-driven economies. These 
innovation-driven countries still have a 
more well-developed economy 
according to the WEF, which underlines 
the importance of cost and time to start a 
business as entrepreneurial driver. 
However, this could also be explained in 
reversed causality, since on average it is 
the most costly and timely to start a business in factor-driven economies. The following table 
shows the descriptive statistics of the selected variables. 
                                                 
8 A country is counted as having a pre-condition in time to start a business, when in 2006 they had a value of 20 
days or less which makes roughly one third of the countries. 
A country is counted as having a pre-condition in cost to start a business, when in 2006 they had a value of 10% 
or less which makes roughly one third of the countries. 
Graph 4 Entry density for countries with pre-conditions by 
economic development 
Graph 3 Quartiles of necessity-driven entrepreneurship per 
economic development 
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The data includes a few outliers for the measures of time, cost and entry density. Regarding 
time and cost Suriname is the biggest irregularity where in 2006 it took 690 days (Z-Score =8 
.2) and 161 % (Z-Score = 5.6) of income per capita to start a business. Regarding entry 
density, New Zealand and Panama have Z-Scores above 4. While the entry density of New 
Zealand is explained by its excellent conditions for starting a business (first place on the 
World Banks’ ranking for Doing Business and among others also first in cost of starting a 
business with 0,2 % of cost per capita income). Panama only ranks on place 70. The high 
entry density of Panama could be explained by the publication of the the Panama Papers, 
(2016) when Panama became known as a tax heaven. An extreme example of this effect can 
be observed for the Virgin Islands (not included in the sample), where entry density of new 
companies between 2002 and 2009 was between 4300 and 2600, at least 28 times higher 
compared to the next highest value. 
Note: The average time to start a business is 25,4 days and the average cost are 80,3 % of pc income. 
Precondition_Time, Precondition_Cost, Precondition_Both are self-constructed dummy variables stating 
whether a country belongs to the lowest third in time, cost or both for the year 2006. Around 25% of all 
countries have pre-conditions in both. No_Precondition is the flipped dummy for Preconditions_Both to 
allow a more intuitive interpretation of regression results. Only_Time, Only_Cost, No_Treatment, denotes 
the regulatory performance for time and cost over the whole time period in reference to 2006. Both includes 
countries, which reduced either time or cost or both. Only 17,3% of all countries did improve neither time 
nor cost. High_Necessity reports factor-driven and efficiency driven countries (see Appendix 4 global 
competitiveness) and is used as a proxy for countries with above-average necessity-driven entrepreneurship 
rates. 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics 
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The panel shows negative serial correlation (p < 0,1; Appendix 5, test 7). This is not unusual, 
since regional shocks (such as the financial crisis) have lasting effects not only on one year 
but also the years after (Wooldridge, 2011). However, negative serial correlation may not 
affect standard errors as severely. An effective way to deal with this, is to cluster standard 
errors on country level (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
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4. Empirical Evaluation 
Due to strong year effects like the financial crisis and national idiosyncrasies, we controlled 
for time and country fixed effects. As precedentially used by many researchers in policy 
analysis (Wolfers, 2003) “fixed effects” is an established method for analyzing the effect of 
policy changes. “The fixed-effects model controls for all time-invariant differences between 
the individuals, so the estimated coefficients of the fixed-effects models cannot be biased 
because of omitted time-invariant characteristics...[like culture, religion, gender, race, etc]” 
(Torres-Reyna, 2007 p.9) 
 
 
Graph 5 Impact of isolated policy-changes 
Note: In a first approach to analyze the isolated impact of single policy treatments, the countries were 
split into categories based on their regulatory behavior over the whole sample period for their reduction in 
time and cost to start a business. Graph 3 shows the performance regarding entry density of the four resulting 
categories over time. Countries in the category “no treatment” (therefore no changes in cost or time to start a 
business) are represented on the secondary axis (right). All other categories are displayed on the primary Y 
axis (left) in reference (difference) to the “no treatment” category. Countries without treatment dropped 
slightly in entry density across the sample period. Countries that improved time or time and cost rose 
stronger in entry density, while countries that only improved time performed worse compared to the “no-
treatment” category. An improvement was considered, when a country reduced the time or cost by at least 
20% compared to the base value in 2006. There is no risk of bias in the sample from countries that 
eventually improved and degraded conditions again. All countries either performed treatments or did not 
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4.1. Theoretical Models 
To test H1 we used the following regression: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡  (1) 
The bases c and t denote the specific value of country c and year t fixed effects. Time and 
country effects are included as dummies, allowing for a “dummy variable regression”, that 
produces identical coefficients and standard errors as the “within” (fixed effects) estimator. 𝛽3 
controls for all variables selected in chapter 3.1.2. The term 𝑎𝑐 describes the individual 
intercept for each country c and captures time-invariant unobserved characteristics such as 
culture. This allows to assess the net effect of the predictor on the outcome variable. The 
variable 𝑢𝑐𝑡 denotes the time and country variant error term.(Wooldridge, 2011). Since it is a 
log – log model the interpretation for the coefficients 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 represent the percentage 
change in entry density for a 1% increase in time and cost respectively (also called the 
elasticity of entry density). 
To test H2 and H3  we ran the same regression but included an interaction term between cost 
and time with a dummy variable that measures the influence of the hypothesized condition: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 +
 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡     (2) 
The dummy variables for the interactions are the previously introduced variables high 
necessity and pre-conditions (no-precondition respectively). As before, for robustness, cost 
and time have been tested joint and separately. The interaction with the dummy requires 
special coding, since the conditions, whether a country has existing pre-conditions or high 
rates of necessity driven entrepreneurship, are time constant (countries with high rates of 
necessity-driven entrepreneurship stayed in this category across the whole time frame) and 
would get swept away by the fixed effects transformation (Wooldridge, 2011). The interaction 
can still be shown by leaving out the dummy variable itself and only including it in the 
interaction term. In this case 𝛽1 or 𝛽2 take the value of the left-out dummy.  
In case of the H2, interpretation of the resulting interaction is 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑐𝑡 or 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑐𝑡as 
base variable for 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑁𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 0 (therefore countries with low share of necessity driven 
entrepreneurship) and:  
𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑁𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦  or  
𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑁𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦  
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for countries with high share of necessity driven entrepreneurship - 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑁𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 1. For H3 
interpretation works accordingly with no-precondition (Wooldridge, 2011). 
To address multicollinearity Klapper and Love, (2012) performed separate regressions for 
each institutional indicator. While this might be a reliable method to reject irrelevant factors, 
results can also be biased about magnitude and significance (Acemoglu, 2005). Time and cost 
to start a business showed significant correlation, which also raises concerns about the true 
assessment of their magnitude. Especially the first hypothesis seems difficult to answer by 
simple comparison of coefficients. Therefore, to accommodate a robust conclusion, 
regressions will be run in a joint model including cost and time, but also separately. 
Additionally, these models will be performed including and excluding control variables.  
H4 was tested similarly to H1 except the dependent variable entry density was exchanged for 
the rates of opportunity and necessity-driven entrepreneurship. 
𝑇𝐸𝐴 − 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡  (3) 
𝑇𝐸𝐴 − 𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑢𝑐𝑡 (4) 
4.2. Results 
Table 5 is the first model representing equation 1 to test for H1. R
2 are high, which is in 
dummy variable regressions not surprising, since time and country dummies are included 
(Wooldridge, 2011). The variables of interest, time and cost, show no strong variation across 
the different models, which is a sign of good robustness.  
Interestingly, only model 2, shows significance for cost (p < 0,1). The interpretation is 
intuitive. A 1% decrease in cost to start a business is associated with a 0,153% increase in 
entry density. Analyzing the control variables, only GNI per capita shows significant positive 
impact. This regression gives a first idea for H1, whether procedural or monetary policies have 
a stronger influence on fostering entrepreneurship. From the result of regression 2 the 
conclusion is to accept H1a and reject H1b – monetary policies have a stronger impact for 
incentivizing entrepreneurship compared to procedural policies. Nevertheless, as the results of 
all other regressions are not significant we should consider the results of the following 
hypotheses as well to derive at a final statement about H1. 
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Table 6 shows the regressions performed for H2. Results indicate a significant effect of cost 
reductions for countries with high-necessity rates across all regressions and a low to none 
existing significance of time reductions. The model including all controls and interactions in 
regression 5 indicates a 0,277% increase of entry density for dropping the cost to start a 
business by 1% in countries with high necessity entrepreneurship. For low necessity countries 
there is no significant impact of monetary or procedural policies. This result is almost 3 times 
as high, as the prediction of the World Bank, (2017c) – 1% increase for a 10% drop in cost. 
Notably, in the joint model only cost, but not time coefficients are significant. In Appendix 5 
Table 5 Regression of time and cost with and without control variables 
  Empirical Evaluation 
28   
the ANOVA tests (number 3 and 4) confirm also the significance of the cost variable for 
regression 5 (p < 0,001), and the support of the null hypothesis that both coefficients are zero 
for the time variable (p > 0,2) Hence, cost policies have a stronger influence in countries with 
high necessity-driven entrepreneurship and H2 can be accepted.  
 
Table 7 shows the regression results for answering H3. For a more intuitive interpretation of 
the regression (in line with the previous regressions), the dummy of pre-conditions has been 
reversed (“no pre-condition” takes the value 1 for countries that do not have pre-conditions). 
On this hypothesis, comparable results as in the earlier regression on high necessity could be 
expected, since in fact only 8,5% of high necessity countries have beneficial preconditions, so 
the distinction is similar. Nevertheless, results vary. Compared to the previous regression 
results, also time reformation has significance. However, also for these countries, cost 
reformations have a stronger impact on entry density. Regression 5, which includes both 
variables and interactions, shows a 0,068% higher entry density for lowering the time to start 
a business by 1% - ceteris paribus (the interpretation of the interaction is the same as in H2). 
Table 6 Regression with interaction for high necessity driven entrepreneurship 
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For cost this effect is with 0,172% almost 3 times as high. These results show that we can 
accept H3. A rather surprising finding is the “punishing” effect of time and cost reformation 
for countries with existing preconditions. The findings suggest a reversed effect of further 
cost and time reduction for countries with beneficial pre-conditions (therefore no-
precondition = 0). While for cost, this finding is not significant across all regressions, for time 
it is. Appendix 5 (tests 5 and 6) show the ANOVA tests performed in order to test the nested 
regression-models 1 and 5 and 3 and 5 of table 7 against each other. In this case, we can reject 
(p < 0,005) the null hypothesis for cost and time that the coefficients are both 0. Therefore 
time and cost to start a business make a significant impact on entry density for countries with 
no preconditions. 
H4 (the influence of time and cost reformations is only positive for opportunity but not 
necessity driven entrepreneurship) is more difficult to research, due to the limited amount of 
data. Regressions 1-3 in table 7 use the rate of opportunity entrepreneurship as dependent 
variable, while regressions 4-6 use necessity entrepreneurship. Overall time and cost reforms 
do not show much significance. Only cost to start a business is significant (p < 0,1) in the 
separate regression of necessity entrepreneurship. In tribute to the lower amount of data, the 
magnitude of the coefficient cannot play a primary role, but rather its algebraic sign. Since the 
Table 7 Regression including interaction about pre-conditions 
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coefficient is positive, it suggests a higher rate of necessity driven entrepreneurship for higher 
cost to start a business. However, coefficients for opportunity-driven entrepreneurship are 
positive as well, even though not significant. Therefore, our results indicate that H4 is 
rejected.  
  
Table 8 Comparison of opportunity and necessity- driven entrepreneurship 
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5. Discussion 
Not only entrepreneurship, but also procedural and monetary policies can be measured in 
several ways. The review of the present literature exposed the diversity of independent 
variables used to explain entrepreneurship. Table 2 provided 44 variables commonly used to 
measure entrepreneurship grouped in 6 categories. The goal of this process was to bring more 
clarity into the diversity of indicators used to explain entrepreneurship in research. This 
contribution to a more standardized framework of entrepreneurship research can help further 
research in the future to achieve more comparable results.  
The risk of multicollinearity in this field of research is high, even with variables taken from 
different data sources. For the specific variable collection in this research, more or less 
complete variables sets from several data sources for each possible control variable were 
collected. An extensive consolidation and testing process resulted in a set of 8 control 
variables additionally to the two main variables cost and time to start a business. Results 
seemed robust after comparing regressions including and excluding control variables and 
clustering standard errors across countries. 
When trying to understand whether monetary policies or procedural policies have a stronger 
impact on entrepreneurship we observed that monetary policies or regulations show a stronger 
positive influence on the entry rate of companies compared to procedural policies or 
regulations. Namely the evidence points to a 1,53% increase in entry density for a 10% drop 
in cost to start a business (please see Table 5). This finding is in line with the World Bank’s 
finding, which is close to the 1% increase (World Bank, 2017c) and hence a good sign of 
robust results. As hypothesized, in countries with high share of necessity-driven 
entrepreneurship (which are usually the less economically developed countries), lowering the 
cost to start a business has a stronger impact on the entry density than time to start a business. 
The results could not find evidence that cost to start a business is also a stronger influence for 
country with low rates of necessity-driven entrepreneurship. 
For countries that had no pre-conditions (a country was considered to have pre-conditions 
when it belonged to the lowest third in time, cost or both for the year 2006) in cost or time, 
both policy-measures had a significant impact. On the other hand, policies in countries with at 
least one pre-condition have surprisingly a reversed relationship to lowering cost or time to 
start a business. A possible explanation of this effect is the development of the job market 
and the saturation of new company entry. As already mentioned, having pre-conditions 
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correlates with a higher economic competitiveness (only 10% of factor driven countries have 
pre-conditions in cost and time). This means, entry density already is at a higher level, but 
also that the domestic industry offers a higher amount of jobs which compete with 
entrepreneurship (Acs et al., (2008)). If it is assumed, that entry density could reach a 
saturation, which depends on the job market equilibrium, countries with pre-conditions seem 
to be more saturated in entrepreneurial entry. In these countries new entrepreneurial 
opportunities are filled in quickly and people who might start a company, in less developed 
economies, see a better opportunity in joining the job market. In this argumentation lowering 
the time or cost variable in the dataset for pre-conditional countries triggers reverse causality 
– hence, it is more likely, that entrepreneurship is oversaturated. 
This research could not find evidence to accept H4. Only a weak positive relationship between 
rising cost of entry and increasing necessity-driven entrepreneurship could be found. 
However, the results suggest the direction of the findings of Acs (2006) and Soto (1989), that 
necessity-entrepreneurship and the informal markets (which according to Desai, (2009) 
correlate positively with each other) rise with the cost of entry.  
We previously discussed the different roles of entrepreneurship measures. While the TEA-
oriented measures include also very early stage “baby entrepreneurs”, entry density only 
measures the formally registered ones. The combination between the evidence from H2, (using 
entry density) which showed the effectiveness of cost policies for countries with high-
necessity entrepreneurship rates, and the finding of H4 (using TEA-OPP/NEC), that neither 
necessity-driven entrepreneurship nor opportunity-driven entrepreneurship are affected by 
cost reductions, rises an interesting implication. If cost policies would incentivise non-
entrepreneurs to start a new business we could expect the TEA indicators in H4 to 
significantly rise as well when lowering entry barriers(Acs et al., 2008; Djankov et al., 2002; 
Soto, 1989). As this is not the case, there is only one explanation for the significantly positive 
impact of cost policies on entry density - these policies only help to give incentive to informal 
entrepreneurs to register their business. In short: Reducing cost (and time in certain countries) 
are effective to attract existing entrepreneurs to formality, and not incenting non-
entrepreneurs to start a new business. This finding seems also plausible with the illustration of 
the entrepreneurial process in Appendix 2, considering the impact of time and cost and the 
firm-birth-stage.   
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6. Limitations 
This dissertation includes some limitations one might like to address in subsequent research. 
The cross-country dataset does not control for regional differences. In some countries, 
regulations are not binding to all states and fluctuations in entry density vary strongly across 
states (e.g. Silicon Valley in the U.S.). Future research could bring the analysis on industry or 
company level for further distinctions to identify demographic clusters that respond 
differently to certain policies. This would allow policymakers to target entrepreneurs more 
specifically and reach the desired effects. The issue regarding the lack of data for the GEM 
dataset has been sufficiently discussed. With further countries added and complete 
observations, in the future more detailed research will be possible on opportunity and 
necessity-driven entrepreneurship. Also, for the World Bank dataset it would be preferable to 
have more complete variables and countries. The difficulty to analyze interdependencies 
between two policies is the variety of possible omitted factors. Some variables, which would 
have helped to explain entrepreneurship better, did not have enough data or covered enough 
countries. While for the WEF categorization on economic competitiveness, all three 
categories were represented in a balanced way. In the World Banks’ categorization on income 
level, no country was represented from the low-income segment. Data collection in third 
world countries is often a major challenge due to the missing infrastructure. Also, the majority 
of countries in the data were European. Preferably, the dataset should contain countries of all 
income groups and regions.  
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7. Conclusion 
This dissertation examines the impact of procedural and monetary policy changes on 
entrepreneurship under different conditions using fixed effects in 75 countries across 8 years. 
Procedural policy making is represented by the variable “time to start a business” (days), 
while monetary policies are measured by “cost to start a business” (percentage of pc income). 
Both variables are provided by the World Bank and impact entrepreneurs at the same point in 
the entrepreneurial process to enter formal markets. Entrepreneurship is measured by the entry 
density of newly registered companies, which measures the formal economy only. 
Theoretical Implications 
The results contribute to the literature in several important ways. This research provides a 
review of the most used variables for explaining entrepreneurship. While the composition 
may still vary for future research, the selection will very likely consist of the 44 variables in 
table 2. This is important, because so far researchers used an uncontrolled diversity of 
indicators which made their results very hard to compare. More comprehensive studies as this 
are needed to uniformize the measure of entrepreneurship so studies can be comparable in the 
way entrepreneurship is measured and explained. 
The positive impact for lowering time to start a business and cost to start a business have 
been explored before (Djankov et al., 2002; Evans and Leighton, 1989). Yet, so far it 
remained unclear which of them has the stronger impact to foster entrepreneurship. Most 
research on entrepreneurial policy making focused on a single isolated variable. This 
dissertation provides a different view by comparing explicitly the impact of two variables – 
cost and time to start a business. This opens the door for further research on interdependent 
relations between policy changes of more than one variable. Further important implications 
for the academic community is the closure of the gap between the findings of Acs, (2006) and 
Sautet, (2013) on the one hand, that necessity driven entrepreneurship has a negative impact 
on the economy, and Soto, (1989) on the other hand, that higher regulations and entry barriers 
prevent entrepreneurs from entering the formal economy. We show that lowering entry 
barriers for entrepreneurs has a positive impact on the entrepreneurship rate and the economy, 
but mostly by transforming informal entrepreneurs in formal ones. This effect should find 
deeper attention in future research and could play a deciding role even for re-evaluating 
existing literature, which uses a formal measure of entrepreneurship such as entry density. 
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Managerial implications 
The implications for governments and policy makers are extensive. Primarily, cost reforms 
have a higher potential to foster entrepreneurship compared to procedural reforms, which is 
important for future policies or regulations. However, especially lower developed, factor or 
efficiency-driven countries – where costs or time to start a business are usually above average 
- can create a positive impact on entrepreneurship with procedural policies (like Namibia or 
Zambia). An unprecedented finding is that the reduction of these entry barriers does not seem 
to actually incent new entrepreneurship, but only the formal entry of existing ones. This 
underlines the importance for countries with a big informal sector and high rates of necessity 
entrepreneurs to lower the entry barriers, mainly through monetary reforms. Countries with 
high-necessity rates (like Bolivia, South Africa or Tunesia), which only focused on cost 
policies showed strong improvements in entry density. However, this also means that in order 
to promote new nascent entrepreneurs, different levers than just lowering entry barriers need 
to be pulled. Recommendations for efficiency-driven countries depend on the development 
status, but countries like Costa Rica or Guatemala, which did not pass any policies along the 
analysed time-frame, noticably lowered in entry density, while every other efficiency-driven 
country with treatments improved. Innovation driven countries without any pre-conditions 
(like Portugal, Slovenia or Japan) showed great improvements on entrepreneurship after time 
and cost reforms. Graph 4 already suggested the strong difference in entry density between 
innovation-driven countries that have a less developed policy environment regarding cost and 
time to start a business and countries with a low cost and short procedures. Hence, if these 
countries catch up in procedural and monetary policies they can have a stong impact on 
lowering the amount of informally operating entrepreneurs. 
Even though procedural regulations seemed less important, they can have strong effects when 
tackling the right bottleneck. In Mexico the number of registered companies increased by 5% 
after simplifying business registrations (Bruhn, 2008) and in Singapore an electronic 
registration system pushed annual business registrations by 75% (Klapper et al., 2006). 
Policymakers need to be more considerate when planning procedural reduction to have a real 
impact, while monetary reductions are a more straight-forward and fail-safe method. 
However, in order to truly create new entrepreneurs instead of transferring existing ones into 
the formal economy, policy makers need to focus on further things like entrepreneurs as 
individuals, their education and the allocation of resources to them. Though, easier and 
cheaper procedures for them certainly will not create any damage. 
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Appendix 1: List of Procedures for Starting Up a Company 
Note: This table provides an overview of common procedures to start a company from 85 
countries, adapted from (Djankov et al., 2002) 
1. Screening procedures 
- Certify business competence 
- Certify a clean criminal record 
- Certify marital status 
- Check the name for uniqueness 
- Notarize company deeds 
- Notarize registration certificate 
- File with the Statistical Bureau 
- File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, 
Ministry of the Economy, or the 
respective ministries by line of business 
- Notify municipality of start-up date 
 
 
- Obtain certificate of compliance with the 
company law 
- Obtain business license (operations permit) 
- Obtain permit to play music to the public 
(irrespective of line of business) 
- Open a bank account and deposit start-up 
capital 
- Perform an official audit at start-up 
- Publish notice of company foundation 
- Register at the Companies Registry 
- Sign up for membership in the Chamber of 
Commerce or Industry or the Regional Trade 
Association 
2. Tax-related requirements 
- Arrange automatic withdrawal of the 
employees’ income tax from the company 
payroll 
funds 
- Designate a bondsman for tax purposes 
- File with the Ministry of Finance 
 
 
- Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax 
Authorities 
- Register for corporate income tax 
- Register for VAT 
- Register for state taxes 
- Register the company bylaws with the Tax 
Authorities 
- Seal, validate, rubricate accounting books 
3. Labor/social security-related requirements 
- File with the Ministry of Labor 
- Issue employment declarations for all 
employees 
- Notarize the labor contract 
- Pass inspections by social security officials 
- Register for accident and labor risk insurance 
 
- Register for health and medical insurance 
- Register with pension funds 
- Register for Social Security 
- Register for unemployment insurance 
- Register with the housing fund 
 
4. Safety and health requirements 
- Notify the health and safety authorities and 
obtain authorization to operate from the 
Health Ministry 
- Pass inspections and obtain certificates 
related to work safety, building, fire, 
sanitation, and hygiene
 
5. Environment-related requirements 
- Issue environmental declaration 
- Obtain environment certificate 
- Obtain sewer approval 
- Obtain zoning approval 
- Pass inspections from environmental officials 
- Register with the water management and 
water discharge authorities 
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Appendix 2: The Entrepreneurial Process 
Graph 6 The entrepreneurial process 
 
Note: Source: With changes adapted from (GEM, 2017). This graph illustrates the entrepreneurial process 
combined with entrepreneurial measures. From this illustration, the difference between TEA and entry density 
becomes clear. While the TEA captures entrepreneurs from all stages, entry density captures them upon 
registration and their entry into the formal sector. Time and cost to start a business impact entrepreneurs at the 
same point of time in the registration process making them ideal for comparison. 
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Appendix 3: Collection of Empirical Studies about Entrepreneurial Development 
Table 9 Collection of empirically relevant studies 
Study Dependent Variable Independent significant variables Main Findings Data 
(Cancino et 
al., 2015) 
Sales Development  
Employee Development 
Capital Raised  
(of new companies) 
Gender of founders 
Education 
Experience 
Funding subsidy received (treated group) 
- Impact on sales of treatment was positive significant 
depending on the model used; 
- Impact on employee growth of treatment was positive 
significant; 
- No influence of the capability to raise capital; 
Own Survey 
Data 
(Estrin et al., 
2013) 
Employment Growth in new 
companies (Expected %-
change within 5 years) 
Level of Corruption 
Size of State 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Quality of Property Rights 
Economic Characteristics (e.g. GDP, FDIs) 
Individual Characteristics (e.g. knows 
Angels Investors) 
- Entrepreneurs with higher growth aspirations rely more 
on the formal sector (more influence from e.g. property 
rights or corruption); 
- Size of the state effects entrepreneurs negatively; 
GEM 
WHF 
(Murdock, 
2012) 
Entry Rate of New Firms 
(ERNF) 
General Business Regulations (Index) 
Location of Policies (Gov Exp to local gov) 
R&D Investments to higher education 
Presence of Venture Capital (Likert Scale) 
Economic Growth 
Population Growth 
- The outcomes of policies are very hard to predict; 
- Business regulations negatively impact entrepreneurship; 
- The location of policymaking has no significant 
influence; 
- Educational spending has significant positive influence; 
Eurostat 
WEF 
(Klapper and 
Love, 2012) 
Entry Density of newly 
registered companies per 
1000 working age adults 
Number of steps, Time, Minimum capital 
necessary to register a business 
Reforms performed (dummy) 
GDP growth 
Registering Property 
Getting Credit 
Enforcing Contracts 
Resolving Insolvency 
- The ease of starting a business is a highly significant 
factor for business entry; 
- Small reforms have generally no significant effect; 
- Economies with weaker business environment need big 
reform packages for a significant effect; 
World Bank  
(Aidis et al., 
2012) 
Startup Activity (%) - 
Dummy Variables of 
Individuals Engaging in 
Nascent Entrepreneurship 
Country Level Startup Rate 
Size of Government 
Freedom of Corruption 
GDP 
Secondary Education 
Higher Education 
Personal Data (Gender, Age, Network, 
Employment years…) 
- Size of state has a negative influence on entry; 
- Freedom of corruption is significantly related to entry; 
- Only marginal Influence from market freedom; 
GEM 
World Bank 
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Study Dependent Variable Independent significant variables Main Findings Data 
(Da Rin et 
al., 2011) 
Newly incorporated 
companies by industry 
Effective Average Tax RatePro-Business 
Policies (WHF 
Scale)BureaucracyCorruptionGovernment 
StabilityElection YearGovernment 
Fragmentation 
- Significant negative effect of corporate income taxation 
on entry rates; 
- Concave tax effects, therefor tax reduction effect entry 
only below a certain threshold; 
Amadeus 
(Koellinger 
and Minniti, 
2009) 
Country level rates of 
nascent entrepreneurship 
split between opp vs. nec 
Unemployment support index 
Unemployment as % of GDP 
Unemployment rate 
- Higher unemployment benefits crowd out nascent 
entrepreneurial activity; 
- Results robust for opportunity vs. necessity or innovation 
vs. imitative driven 
GEM 
 
(McMullen 
et al., 2008) 
Country level rates of 
nascent entrepreneurship 
split between opportunity 
and necessity 
10 individual factors of economic freedom 
and GDP 
- GDP is negatively associated with opp and nec 
protection of property rights is associated positively with 
opportunity motivated entry 
GEM 
WHF 
(Cumming, 
2007) 
845 Australian 
entrepreneurial firms in 
venture capital and private 
equity funds evaluated by 
exit success and share price 
returns of IPOs 
Individual Fund Size 
MSCI Investment Horizon 
Investment Year + Duration 
Industry market/book 
Syndication 
- The governmental IIF is more successful than private 
VCs in staging syndication, which leads to higher value 
added of the investee; 
- The IIF has at least equal or better success compared to 
private VCs; 
AVCAL 
(Lerner and 
Schoar, 
2010) 
Country level entry rates of 
incorporated firms 
Entry costs (incorporation procedures) 
Employment rights 
Financial system development 
Quality of state governance 
- Financial system matters for per capita entry rate, 
depending on estimation method; 
- Entry procedures matter for entry rates per capita, 
depending on estimation method; 
World Bank 
(van Stel et 
al., 2007) 
Country level rates of 
nascent entrepreneurship & 
young business Rate 
Starting a business 
Hiring and firing workers 
Getting credit 
Paying taxes 
Closing a business 
- Minimum capital requirements have negative effect; 
- Labor market rigidity has a negative effect; 
- Countries with more nascent entrepreneurs also have 
more young businesses; 
- GDP growth rates have a positive effect on opportunity 
entrepreneurship; 
- Private bureau coverage has a positive effect; 
GEM 
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Study Dependent Variable Independent significant variables Main Findings Data 
(Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 
2006) 
Individual level indicator 
variable related to 
incorporated form 
Entry cost (incorporation procedures) 
Financial system development 
Tax disadvantage 
Legal origin 
Bankruptcy procedures 
Legal protection in solving disputes 
Share of unofficial economy 
Protection of shareholders’ rights 
- Companies incorporate rather when a country has: 
- Well-developed financial sector and legal system; 
- Efficient bankruptcy procedures 
- Low regulatory and tax burdens 
World Bank 
(Klapper et 
al., 2006) 
Market entry (new limited-
liability firms),  
Average size of entrant, 
Growth 
Industry Share 
Entry CostGDP 
Corruption 
R&D Intensity 
Tax Disadvantage 
- Costly regulations hamper entry of new firms; 
- New entrants within such regulations need to be larger; 
- Incumbents in normally "high-entry" industries grow 
slower. 
Amadeus 
(Wennekers 
et al., 2005) 
Country level rates of 
nascent entrepreneurship 
Entry costs (procedures) 
Per Capita Income 
Tax Revenue 
Internet per Capital 
Social Security Cost 
Innovation Index 
Business Ownership 
- U-Shaped relationships between nascent 
entrepreneurship and per Capita Income, Innovation 
Capacity Index, Incumbent business ownership rate, tax 
revenues, community growth; 
- Higher social security expenditure has a negative effect; 
- Higher government tax revenues have a positive effect; 
GEM 
(Djankov et 
al., 2002) 
Corruption 
Bureaucracy 
Number of Procedures for entry 
Time needed for entry 
Cost of entry 
GDP 
Corruption 
Effectiveness of legislature 
- Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher 
corruption and larger unofficial economies; 
- In most countries business entry is extremely expensive 
(measuring cost + time) 
World Bank, 
Own Survey 
Data 
(Gentry and 
Hubbard, 
2000) 
Self-employment of the head 
of the household 
Tax rate on employment 
Convexity in tax rate 
Earning 
Education 
Age, Gender, Minority Group, Marital 
Status 
- Progressive tax schedules with imperfect loss offsets 
discourage entry (while proportional tax with full loss 
offsets do not); 
- Significant increase in entry when tax rates are less 
progressive 
PSID 
Note: Sorted from newest to oldest (Source: Authors Creation) 
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Appendix 4: Definitions of Variables Used 
Table 10 Variable definitions 
Name Definition Source 
ID 
A unique value for each row created through the connection of country and year and the 
elimination of spaces 
Authors 
Creation 
Country Name of the country from the pool of 75 countries available in the dataset   
Year Year within the range from 2006-2013   
Region 
Region assigned to country according to the World Bank classification (December 2016) World 
Bank 
Income 
Group 
Income Group assigned to country according to the World Bank classification (December 
2016) 
World 
Bank 
Global 
Competitiv
eness 
Global Competitiveness assigned to country according to the World Economic Forum. To be 
considered for the next highest category a country must fulfill the basic requirements of their 
present category, which increase in sophistication. For more information on the pillars of 
each category see graph below the table. For the precise calculation procedures see: Schwab, 
(2017). 
World 
Economic 
Forum 
Number of 
new 
limited 
liability 
companies 
The study collected information on all limited liability corporations regardless of size. 
Partnerships and sole proprietorships are not considered in the collection process due to the 
differences with respect to their definition and regulation worldwide. Data on the number of 
total or closed firms are not included due to heterogeneity in how these entities are defined 
and measured. 
World 
Bank 
New Entry 
rate 
The number of newly registered firms with limited liability per 1,000 working-age people 
(ages 15-64) per calendar year. 
World 
Bank 
Starting a 
Business - 
Time  
Time is recorded in calendar days. The measure captures the median duration that 
incorporation lawyers indicate is necessary in practice to complete a procedure with 
minimum follow-up with government agencies and no extra payments. The shortest possible 
duration for a procedure is half a day (this applies only to online procedures). 
World 
Bank 
Starting a 
Business – 
Cost 
Cost is recorded as a percentage of the economy’s income per capita. It includes all official 
fees and fees for legal or professional services if such services are required by law or 
commonly used in practice. Fees for purchasing and legalizing company books are included 
if these transactions are required by law. Although value added tax registration can be 
counted as a separate procedure, value added tax is not part of the incorporation cost. Bribes 
are excluded from the analysis. 
World 
Bank 
Registering 
Property-
DTF 
The distance to frontier9 score of registering property is created by averaging the scores in 
the following categories: 
Days to transfer property between two local companies, Cost to transfer property as 
percentage of property value, Steps to transfer property so it can be sold or used as collateral, 
Reliability, transparency and coverage of land administration system. 
World 
Bank 
Getting 
Credit-
DTF 
The distance to frontier score of registering property is created by averaging the scores in the 
following categories: 
Regulations on nonpossessory security interests in movable security, Scope, quality and 
accessibility of credit information through credit bureaus and registries. 
World 
Bank 
Resolving 
Insolvency-
DTF 
The distance to frontier score of registering property is created by averaging the scores in the 
following categories: 
Recovery Rate, Strength of insolvency framework index. 
World 
Bank 
Enforcing 
Contracts-
DTF 
The distance to frontier score of registering property is created by averaging the scores in the 
following categories: 
Days to resolve commercial sale dispute through the court, Attorney, court and enforcement 
cost as % of claim value, Use of good practices promoting quality and efficiency. 
World 
Bank 
                                                 
9 About the DTF (Distance to Frontier) variables: The distance to frontier score helps assess the absolute level of regulatory 
performance over time. It measures the distance of each economy to the “frontier,” which represents the best performance 
observed on each of the indicators across all economies in the Doing Business sample since 2005. One can both see the gap 
between a particular economy’s performance and the best performance at any point in time and assess the absolute change in 
the economy’s regulatory environment over time as measured by Doing Business. An economy’s distance to frontier is 
reflected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest performance and 100 represents the frontier. 
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Paying 
Taxes - 
Total tax 
rate (% of 
profit) 
Total tax rate measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by 
businesses after accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions as a share of 
commercial profits. Taxes withheld (such as personal income tax) or collected and remitted 
to tax authorities (such as value added taxes, sales taxes or goods and service taxes) are 
excluded. 
World 
Bank 
GDP 
(current 
US$) 
GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar 
figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange 
rates. 
World 
Bank 
GNI per 
capita, 
Atlas 
method 
(current 
US$) 
GNI per capita is the gross national income, converted to USD using the World Bank Atlas 
method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident 
producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus 
net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from 
abroad. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official 
exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when 
the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate 
actually applied in international transactions. 
World 
Bank 
Governme
nt Integrity 
From the HF Economic Freedom Index, government integrity is a measure of corruption. 
The score for this component is derived by averaging scores for the following six sub-
factors, all of which are weighted equally: 
Public trust in politicians, Irregular payments and bribes, Transparency of government 
policymaking, Absence of corruption, Perceptions of corruption, Governmental and civil 
service transparency. 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Total early 
stage 
Entreprene
urial 
Activity 
Representing the percentage of 18-64 population who are either a nascent entrepreneur or 
owner-manager of a new business. 
Global 
Entreprene
urship 
Monitor 
Opportunit
y Driven 
TEA 
Opportunity-Driven Entrepreneurial Activity; Those involved in TEA who claim to be 
driven by opportunity as opposed to finding no other option for work. 
Global 
Entreprene
urship 
Monitor 
Necessity 
Driven 
TEA 
Necessity-Driven Entrepreneurial Activity; Those involved in TEA who are involved in 
entrepreneurship because they had no other option for work. 
Global 
Entreprene
urship 
Monitor 
Note: Definitions of all variables in the dataset. Sources according to “Data Sources” in the Reference chapter 
 
Graph 7 Criteria used for categorization of global competitiveness 
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Appendix 5: T-Tests 
Test 1: Welch Two Sample t-test: entry density on no precondition 
t = 8.8715, df = 205.24, p-value = 3.567e-16 
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0 
 
95 percent confidence interval: 
 2.726968   4.285394 
 
mean of x mean of y  
 6.090976   2.584795 
 
The p-value is lower than 0.05 so we can reject the null hypothesis that the two entry density 
means of countries with and without pre-conditions are the same. 
 
Test 2: Welch Two Sample t-test: entry density on high necessity 
t = 6.8104, df = 364.06, p-value = 4.034e-11 
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0 
 
95 percent confidence interval: 
 1.646045   2.982545 
 
mean of x mean of y  
 4.923319   2.609024 
 
The p-value is lower than 0.05 so we can reject the null hypothesis that the two entry density 
means of countries with and without high necessity entrepreneurship rates are the same. 
 
Test 3: Analysis of Variance Table: Cost and High Necessity as additional variables 
Model 1: Log Entry Density ~ Log Time + Log Time:High Necessity + Log Profit Tax + Log Registering 
Property + Log Getting Credit + Log Enforcing Contracts + Log Resolving Insolvency + Log GDP + Log 
GNI pc + Log Government Integrity + as.factor(Year) + as.factor(Country) 
Model 2: Log Entry Density ~ Log Time + Log Cost + Log Time:No Precondition + Log Cost:No 
Precondition + Log Profit Tax + Log Registering Property + Log Getting Credit + Log Enforcing 
Contracts + Log Resolving Insolvency + Log GDP + Log GNI pc + Log Government Integrity + 
as.factor(Year) + as.factor(Country) 
     Res.Df   RSS     Df    Sum of Sq      F                Pr(>F)     
1    508      38.44                                   
2    506      36.11   2     2.8095             19.685     5.853e-09 *** 
 
Test 4: Analysis of Variance Table: Time and High Necessity as additional variables  
Model 1: Log Entry Density ~ Log Cost + Log Cost: High Necessity + Log Profit Tax + Log Registering 
Property + Log Getting Credit + Log Enforcing Contracts + Log Resolving Insolvency + Log GDP + Log 
GNI pc + Log Government Integrity + as.factor(Year) + as.factor(Country) 
Model 2: Log Entry Density ~ Log Time + Log Cost + Log Time:No Precondition + Log Cost:No 
Precondition + Log Profit Tax + Log Registering Property + Log Getting Credit + Log Enforcing 
Contracts + Log Resolving Insolvency + Log GDP + Log GNI pc + Log Government Integrity + 
as.factor(Year) + as.factor(Country) 
     Res.Df   RSS           Df     Sum of Sq      F               Pr(>F)   
1    508       36.991                               
2    506       36.110      2      0.2213           1.5505     0.2131 
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Test 5: Analysis of Variance Table: Cost and No Precondition as additional variables 
Model 1: Log Entry Density ~ Log Time + Log Time:No Precondition + Log Profit Tax + Log Registering 
Property + Log Getting Credit + Log Enforcing Contracts + Log Resolving Insolvency + Log GDP + Log 
GNI pc + Log Government Integrity + as.factor(Year) + as.factor(Country) 
Model 2: Log Entry Density ~ Log Time + Log Cost + Log Time:No Precondition + Log Cost:No 
Precondition + Log Profit Tax + Log Registering Property + Log Getting Credit + Log Enforcing 
Contracts + Log Resolving Insolvency + Log GDP + Log GNI pc + Log Government Integrity + 
as.factor(Year) + as.factor(Country) 
     Res.Df   RSS     Df    Sum of Sq      F                Pr(>F)     
1    508      38.44                                   
2    506      36.46   2     1.9796             13.737     1.551e-06 *** 
 
Test 6: Analysis of Variance Table: Time and No Precondition as additional variables 
Model 1: Log Entry Density ~ Log Cost + Log Cost:No Precondition + Log Profit Tax + Log Registering 
Property + Log Getting Credit + Log Enforcing Contracts + Log Resolving Insolvency + Log GDP + Log 
GNI pc + Log Government Integrity + as.factor(Year) + as.factor(Country) 
Model 2: Log Entry Density ~ Log Time + Log Cost + Log Time:No Precondition + Log Cost:No 
Precondition + Log Profit Tax + Log Registering Property + Log Getting Credit + Log Enforcing 
Contracts + Log Resolving Insolvency + Log GDP + Log GNI pc + Log Government Integrity + 
as.factor(Year) + as.factor(Country) 
     Res.Df   RSS           Df     Sum of Sq      F               Pr(>F)   
1    508       36.991                               
2    506       36.460      2       0.53073        3.6828    0.02583 * 
 
Test 7: Serial Correlation 
Table 11 Serial correlation 
 
Serial correlation tested with the residuals (u) of  
Regression 6 in table 5 
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Appendix 6: Countries Included and Classification 
Table 12 Countries in the sample 
Note: Table 12 shows a list of all countries included in the sample with their global competitiveness index and whether they don’t have pre-conditions or high-necessity rates. 
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